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Abstract
We examine merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in which the acquirer and the
target share a common auditor. We predict that a common auditor can help merging firms
reduce uncertainty throughout the acquisition process, which allows managers to more
efficiently allocate their capital, resulting in higher quality M&As. Consistent with our
prediction, we find that deals with common auditors have higher acquisition
announcement returns than do non-common-auditor deals. Further, we find that the
common-auditor effect is more pronounced for deals with greater pre-acquisition
uncertainty and deals involving acquirers and targets that are audited by the same local
office of the common auditor. We also find that there is an increased probability of an M&A
for firms with a common auditor. Collectively, our evidence suggests that common auditors
act as information intermediaries for merging firms, resulting in higher quality
acquisitions.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines whether the quality of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is higher
when the acquiring firm and target firm share the same external auditor.1 Our intuition is that the
acquisition process often involves considerable uncertainty, including information asymmetry
between bidders and targets regarding their operations, financial health, risk and prospects as
well as uncertainty related to post-acquisition operational synergies. This uncertainty can
negatively impact M&A quality by reducing managers’ ability to identify the most profitable
investment projects (Goodman et al., 2014). We argue that when an acquirer and target share a
common auditor, the auditor can help reduce uncertainty along several dimensions.
First, auditors accumulate a considerable amount of information about their clients
through conducting their audit procedures and through informal discussions with top
management, allowing them to be helpful as information intermediaries both before the M&A
(e.g., identifying potential merger counterparties and assisting with due diligence) and after the
M&A (e.g., integrating accounting systems and internal controls).
Second, since each audit firm has its own unique style of interpreting and implementing
accounting rules (Kothari et al., 2010), firms represented by a common auditor are likely to have
more comparable financial statements (Francis et al., 2014), which leads to a reduction in
uncertainty (De Franco et al., 2011). That is, a merging firm can better understand the
assumptions and choices underlying accounting numbers in financial statements from other firms
that share the same auditor. In turn, this leads to a better understanding (i.e., reduced uncertainty)
of those firms’ economics, as compared to those of firms using different auditors.
Finally, common auditors may be more likely to limit misreporting that asymmetrically

1

Throughout the paper, acquisition “quality” refers to an acquisition’s impact on firm value. To the extent an
acquisition results in a greater increase in firm value, it is considered to be of higher quality (Bouwman et al., 2009;
Goodman et al., 2014; Harford and Uysal, 2014).
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benefits one party over the other. Prior research indicates that acquirers (Louis, 2004; Gong et al.,
2008) and targets (Anilowski et al., 2009) manage earnings before M&As. Thus, auditors that audit
both the acquirer and target face greater litigation risk, as the common auditor may be sued for
earnings management undertaken by either party. Moreover, common auditors likely face greater
scrutiny by stakeholders, given the potential for conflicts of interest. As Agrawal et al. (2013)
show, deals with common M&A advisors attract securities class action lawsuits with greater
frequency than deals with separate advisors. Thus, a common auditor has arguably higher
incentives to limit misreporting ex ante, leading to reduced uncertainty regarding the accuracy of
the reported numbers. By reducing uncertainty during the M&A process, common auditors can
help firms allocate capital more efficiently, resulting in higher quality acquisitions.
To test whether common auditors are associated with higher quality M&As, we use a
sample of 1,971 U.S. acquisitions between 1988 and 2010, where both the acquirer and the target
are public firms and the acquirer obtains complete control of the target after the acquisition. To
capture M&A quality, we use the acquisition announcement return following a large body of
research (e.g., Asquith et al., 1983; Bradley et al., 1988; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Agrawal et al., 2013;
Goodman et al., 2014).
We find that M&As involving firms with a common auditor are of higher quality than
M&As involving firms with different auditors. 2 Further, we test and find that the commonauditor effect is stronger when there is greater pre-acquisition uncertainty, proxied by targets
with higher growth, more volatility, greater research and development (R&D) intensity, and
larger bid-ask spreads. Our results are robust to the inclusion of numerous control variables for
auditor, firm and deal characteristics, the merging firms’ previous business relationships and
geographical proximity, the existence of shared M&A advisors and/or directors, and additional
2

We also examine two ex post, non-market based M&A quality measures (i.e., post-acquisition change in return on
assets and the probability of a post-acquisition goodwill impairment) following Goodman et al. (2014), and we find
qualitatively similar results. See Section 5.2 for more details.
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testing to address endogeneity concerns related to auditor selection. Collectively, these results
are consistent with common auditors reducing uncertainty during the M&A process, which leads
to higher quality M&As.
To get a sense of the economic magnitude of the common auditor effect, consider that the
announcement period abnormal returns are 1.064 percentage points higher in common-auditor
deals than those in non-common-auditor deals. Given that the average market capitalization of an
acquirer (target) in our sample is $8.99 billion ($870 million), this difference in announcement
returns translates into an increase in the combined firm’s market capitalization of $104.9 million.3
We then examine the three mechanisms (discussed above) through which common
auditors reduce M&A uncertainty: (1) discussions with the M&A parties, (2) financial statement
comparability, and (3) limited misreporting. With respect to the first mechanism, we employ two
different empirical approaches. First, we show the common-auditor effect is larger when the
acquirer and target use the same local office of the common auditor, as the auditor can more
easily facilitate discussions between these clients if they are all in the same location. Second, we
show there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with a common auditor, as the
auditor can both better match clients interested in engaging in M&A deals and reduce
uncertainties throughout the process that might otherwise derail the deal.
To explore the second mechanism, i.e., financial statement comparability, we examine
whether firms in common-auditor deals have more comparable financial statements than do firms
in non-common-auditor deals. Using differences in year-specific total accruals (Francis et al.,
2014) and the covariance of earnings across time (Barth et al., 2012; De Franco et al., 2011;

3

That is, ($8.99 billion + $870 million) × 1.064% = $104.9 million. For comparison, consider that Dhaliwal et al.
(2014) find a 0.7% higher return for acquirers in common-auditor M&As. While our return of 1.06% is a little
higher, this might be somewhat expected given our sample involves acquisitions where the acquirer ends up with
100% ownership control after the acquisition instead of 50% (or more) control, as in acquisitions in the Dhaliwal et
al. (2014) sample.
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Lang et al., 2010) as proxies for comparability, we find that acquirers and targets with common
auditors have more comparable financial statements than do those with different auditors.
We also find less misreporting for common-auditor mergers, the third mechanism, using
performance-matched abnormal accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) and financial statement
restatements (Bens et al., 2012) as proxies for misreporting. Combined, these results support our
inferences that common auditors reduce uncertainty in the M&A process by improving (public
and private) communication channels.
Finally, we examine whether the common-auditor effect is mitigated after the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX). Section 201 of SOX prohibits auditors from engaging in non-audit services,
such as M&A advisory and consulting services. To the extent auditors were engaged in non-audit
services before SOX and common auditors used these services to help their clients engage in
better acquisitions, the common-auditor effect should be mitigated post-SOX. However, we find
that the common-auditor effect remains after SOX. This result suggests that the role of common
auditors in reducing uncertainty is unlikely driven by non-audit function communications.
An important caveat to our findings is that, despite all our empirical analyses, discussions
between auditors and their clients are unobservable. Thus, we cannot directly speak to the amount or
type of information provided by common auditors during M&As. Given American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Rule 301 prohibits disclosure of confidential information
without consent from the client, if auditor discussions do indeed contain relevant private information,
it should be approved by the appropriate parties; that said, we recognize there is potential for
conflicts of interest to arise. We leave this for future research and regulators to determine.4
Our study makes several important contributions. First, we add to the literature that
examines the role of auditors in M&As. Prior studies generally examine the roles of acquirer
4

Consistent with conflict of interest concerns, Dhaliwal et al. (2014) find that M&As with a shared auditor are
associated with lower deal premiums and higher (lower) acquirer (target) event returns, which suggests shared
auditors favor acquirers during M&As.
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auditors and target auditors separately. For example, Louis (2005) studies the role of acquirer
auditors in M&A transactions and finds higher acquisition announcement returns for non-Big 4
firms, while other studies find that targets with Big 4 auditors are more likely to get acquired
(Xie et al., 2013) and have greater acquisition synergy and higher acquirer announcement returns
(Golubov et al., 2012). In this study, we consider both acquirer auditors and target auditors in
examining how sharing an auditor influences acquisition performance, providing new insights
into the role of auditors in M&As.
Second, our paper contributes to the emerging literature on the real effects of accounting
and auditing. In particular, prior research finds that accounting information facilitates more
efficient corporate investment by reducing agency problems caused by information asymmetry
(e.g., Biddle et al., 2009; Biddle and Hilary, 2006), by providing peer firms with more
information (e.g., Badertscher et al., 2013), and by providing information to managers within the
firm (Shroff, 2014; McNichols and Stubben, 2008). In addition, Kausar et al. (2014) show that
firms’ choice to obtain an audit helps lower information asymmetry and leads to more efficient
investment. We contribute to this line of research by showing that common auditors reduce
uncertainty in the M&A process, and thus improve M&A quality.
Third, we contribute to the large literature examining the effect of sharing an agent on
economic outcomes. For example, the economics literature analyzes the use of a common agent
as a way for competitors to achieve implicit collusion (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1985; GalOr, 1985, 1986; Vives, 1990). In this setting, a common agent behaves passively and information
transfers among competitors can be widely observed. In contrast, Villas-Boas (1994) and
Gardiner et al. (2007) consider a setting where a common agent can act strategically, and
examine conflicts that arise from sharing the same advertising agency and sharing the same real
estate agent. More closely related to our study, Agrawal et al. (2013) examine the role of
common investment bank advisors in M&As, and find that such deals are somewhat better for
5

acquirers than they are for targets. Similarly, Cai and Sevilir (2012) find that board connections
favor the acquirer, but the manner of benefit is a function of the type of board connection. We
contribute to this literature by providing evidence on the impact of sharing an auditor on M&A
outcomes as well as the mechanisms through which these outcomes manifest.
Finally, our study complements concurrent work by Dhaliwal et al. (2014), who also
examine the role of common auditors in M&A transactions. Our study delves into the
mechanisms through which common auditors affect M&A outcomes. We find evidence
consistent with the common auditor resolving information uncertainty between the parties in the
transaction. Dhaliwal et al. (2014) examine whether one party reaps greater benefits from the
deals and find evidence consistent with the acquirer capturing the benefits, as indicated by higher
acquirer event returns. In addition, Dhaliwal et al.’s study suggests that target firm shareholders
may be worse off because target event returns and deal premiums are lower. While Dhaliwal et
al.’s wealth transfer result is certainly interesting, we find that the overall combined
announcement return is positive. We caution, however, that the studies use somewhat different
samples and tests, and thus the results cannot be fully interpreted together. We leave it to future
research to further examine the various aspects and consequences of a common auditor in M&A
transactions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the M&A process
as well as how a common auditor can help reduce uncertainties in that process. Section 3
describes the sample selection process, and Section 4 details the research design and empirical
results. We present additional analyses in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.

2. Motivation
Mergers and acquisitions represent significant corporate events that involve a thorough
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and dynamic process that can vary from several months to several years to complete. In general,
the M&A process starts with the identification of potential target candidates, which is a function
of the firm’s strategic objectives and requires some preliminary screening of the candidates.
After a candidate is chosen, the firm engages in a lengthy due diligence process, which includes
developing an extensive understanding of the target value as a stand-alone business as well as the
value of potential synergies (Copeland et al., 2000). As GE Capital (2012) indicates,
“Due diligence is not a courtship, a negotiation, or an inquisition; it’s a fact-finding mission…[y]our business
review of the target becomes a true audit, aimed at gaining a thorough understanding of the target’s
operations, assets, liabilities, and outlook. Your due diligence team will be looking to confirm the target’s
representations, validate its valuation, probe any legal, regulatory and compliance concerns, and affirm
expected synergies and integration plans.”

After obtaining considerable information through the due diligence phase, negotiations begin
between the acquirer and target regarding the acquisition price, the deal structure, etc. When the
negotiations are done and the deal is complete, the firms enter the final phase—the integration of
the two firms. There are numerous factors for the acquiring firm to consider during the
integration phase, such as the development and articulation of the vision for the new entity to
employees and other stakeholders, legal and tax issues, human resource issues (e.g., employee
retention/severance), and fixed asset allocations. Further, underlying all of these factors is the
integration of the accounting information systems to capture these economic changes.
As becomes apparent through the above discussion of the M&A process, each phase
contains significant uncertainty. From identifying merger partners to conducting due diligence to
valuing and negotiating the deal to post-M&A integration, managers face uncertainty throughout
the process and its negative impact on firm value. In particular, extant research indicates that
uncertainty negatively affects acquirer announcement returns and post-acquisition performance
(McNichols and Stubben, 2014; Erickson et al., 2012) and that having more firm-specific target
information helps improve acquirer returns and the expected value of combined firms (Martin
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and Shalev, 2009). Given M&As are typically large and important corporate transactions,
managerial incentives are strong to combat adverse selection inherent in the identification and
valuation of potential deals. As a result, firms often turn to investment bankers to serve as
advisors during the M&A process. Consistent with uncertainty driving firms’ decisions to retain
M&A advisors, Servaes and Zenner (1996) find that acquirers hire advisors when the deals are
more complex and when the acquirer lacks prior acquisition experience. Investment banks can
help match acquirers with targets, advise acquirers on target valuation, and/or counsel firms in
negotiating the deal price and structure (Goodman et al. 2014).
While firms hire investment banks to reduce uncertainty in an attempt to make better
investment decisions, we argue that auditors can also serve to reduce uncertainty in the M&A
process, even though they are not explicitly retained by firms to do so. In particular, auditors that
audit both the acquirer and target (i.e., common auditors) can reduce M&A uncertainty through
several channels. The first, and arguably most important, channel is the direct communication of
information between the common auditor and the acquirers and targets, which can happen
throughout the M&A process. As indicated to us in a private conversation with a Big 4
accounting partner, auditors often introduce their clients as potential acquisition partners. Thus,
the auditor can facilitate discussions at the initial stage of the M&A process.
Auditors can also provide considerable value during the due diligence phase, which
includes assessing the target firm’s financial health, risks, prospects, etc. After all, many of these
assessments (or similar assessments) are made by the auditor during an audit, so they can assist
by providing both structure to the due diligence processes/analyses and insights into the target
based on their extensive knowledge of the firm. In fact, further discussion with the Big 4 partner
revealed that, with the consent of clients, audit team members of the acquirer and the target often
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exchange information.5 These discussions can be very useful in appropriately valuing firms, and
thus in negotiating the deal.
The transfer of information between common-auditor clients continues even after the
M&A as well. For example, common auditors can help integrate accounting information systems
and internal control systems following deal completion, which is a nontrivial task that is vital to the
success of the M&A. Since common auditors are familiar with these systems for both the acquiring
firm and the target firm, they can more efficiently amalgamate the systems to better capture the
firm’s economics. Erickson et al. (2012) report increases in uncertainty after M&As, which
contributes to acquirers’ post-acquisition wealth losses. Common auditors can help reduce this
uncertainty by assisting with the integration of the accounting information systems to better capture
the underlying economics of the firm.
The second channel through which common auditors can reduce uncertainty is via financial
statement comparability. Kothari et al. (2010) argue that each accounting firm has its own unique set
of internal working rules that guide and standardize the audit firm’s application of accounting and
auditing standards.6 Francis et al. (2014) argue that because these systematic differences exist across
audit firms, financial statements are more similar for firms with a common auditor than they are for
firms with different auditors. In addition, clients often seek guidance from their auditors when
preparing financial reports, which further contributes to increased comparability of financial
statements across firms with a common auditor. 7 Consistent with common auditors influencing

5

The audit partner also notes that, because of the mandatory audit partner rotation rule, audit firms sometimes bring
an audit partner from another office. Therefore, the audit partner of the acquirer (target) could be a member of the
former audit team for the target (acquirer), which further reduces information asymmetry in M&As.
6
Dichev et al. (2013) suggest that big audit firms do not pass authority downstream to the regional headquarters or
onto the actual auditors as much as they used to do. Interpretations of rules in accounting firms are now made at the
accounting firm level instead of from the field.
7
As an example of auditors’ influence on their clients’ disclosure behavior, Blacconiere et al. (2011) show that Ernst and
Young (E&Y) clients are four times more likely to disavow the reliability of mandated fair-value disclosures than are the
clients of other audit firms. They note that E&Y included a disavowal as an illustrative disclosure in its Statement of
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comparability between firms’ financial statements, Francis et al. (2014) provide evidence that firms
audited by the same auditor have more comparable earnings than firms audited by different auditors.
By enhancing financial statement comparability, common auditors indirectly provide their clients
information that other (non-client) firms may not be able to efficiently obtain. In particular, a client
firm can better understand the assumptions and accounting choices underlying the financial
statement numbers of other client firms. In turn, this knowledge leads to a reduction in
uncertainty regarding those firms’ economics.
The third channel through which common auditors can reduce M&A uncertainty is by
limiting financial statement misreporting. Erickson and Wang (1999) find that acquirers boost
earnings prior to stock-for-stock acquisitions in an effort to increase their stock price and reduce the
number of shares issued in exchange. Louis (2004) and Gong et al. (2008) confirm these findings and
show that the long-term post-acquisition underperformance of stock-for-stock acquirers and postacquisition lawsuits can be attributed to pre-acquisition abnormal accruals. Anilowski et al. (2009)
find that targets also engage in earnings management and sell via auctions to avoid the risk of
detection. The authors also find that such deals result in higher wealth gains to target shareholders.
Given the incentives for both acquirers and targets to manage earnings before M&As,
auditors that audit both the acquirer and target face greater litigation risk, as the common auditor
may be sued for earnings management undertaken by either party. Moreover, common auditors
likely face greater scrutiny by stakeholders, given their role as a common agent with the
opportunity for conflicts of interest. As Agrawal et al. (2013) document, deals with common M&A
advisors attract securities class action lawsuits with greater frequency than deals with separate
advisors. To the extent common auditors face greater litigation (and potentially reputational) risk,

Financial Accounting Standards 123 implementation guidance and encouraged clients to adopt the disclosure.
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they have greater incentives to limit misreporting that asymmetrically benefits one party over the
other, resulting in more transparent financial information and reduced uncertainty.
Collectively, common auditors can help reduce uncertainty throughout the various stages of
the M&A process both directly through private communications with the acquirer and target and
indirectly through more comparable and more transparent public financial reports. This reduction in
uncertainty regarding the firms’ underlying economics facilitates better matching and integration of
acquirers with targets, which leads to higher quality investment decisions.

3. Sample Selection
To conduct our analyses, we obtain a sample of acquisitions from the Thomson Reuters
Securities Data Company (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database. We identify all completed
domestic mergers and acquisitions of public acquirers and public targets with announcement dates
between 1988 and 2010. We start our sample period in 1988 because we obtain auditor information
from Compustat, and its auditor coverage prior to 1988 is limited to Big 8 auditors. We exclude
small transactions in which the deal value is less than $1 million and/or less than 1% of the acquirer’s
market capitalization prior to the announcement date. We also require the acquirer to control less
than 50% of the target before the announcement and own 100% after the deal completion to ensure a
complete change in control.8 We further limit our sample to deals in which both the acquirer and the
target have daily stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and the
annual accounting data and auditor information from Compustat for at least one year prior to the deal

8

Untabulated results show that the common-auditor effect is more pronounced for deals where the acquirer owns no
target shares before the deal, but owns 100% of the target after the deal completion. To the extent pre-acquisition
uncertainty is greater for such deals, this evidence suggests that common auditors have a greater impact when there
is more uncertainty.
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announcement. Applying these filters leaves a final sample of 1,971 acquisitions, where 547 (1,424)
acquisitions are classified as common auditors (non-common-auditor) deals.
Table 1, Panel A presents the distribution of our sample by deal announcement year.
Consistent with the M&A literature, the number of acquisitions drops in the early 2000s from its
highest level in the late 1990s. We also observe a significant slowdown following the 2007-2008
financial crisis. The patterns of common-auditor deals and non-common-auditor deals across years
follow trends similar to that of the overall sample.
Table 1, Panel B shows the industry composition for the acquiring firms in our sample using
the Fama and French 48 industry classification (Fama and French, 1997). Business services,
computers, and pharmaceutical products are the most active industries in our sample in terms of the
number of acquisitions. We observe a similar pattern in common-auditor deals and non-commonauditor deals. Given the variations in merger activity both across time and across industry, as
observed in Table 1, we include both year and industry fixed effects in our multivariate analyses.

4. Research design and empirical results
In this section, we discuss our research design and empirical results related to our three
main analyses. First, we examine the relation between common auditors and M&A quality.
Second, we test whether the relation between common auditors and M&A quality is stronger
when there is greater pre-M&A uncertainty. Finally, we analyze the three mechanisms through
which common auditors reduce uncertainty in the M&A process, namely via (i) private
discussions with the acquirer and target, (ii) enhanced financial statement comparability, and (iii)
limited misreporting.

4.1. Common auditors and M&A quality
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4.1.1. M&A quality measure
As discussed earlier, we predict that M&As with a common auditor are higher quality
because common auditors are able to reduce uncertainty throughout the M&A process, which
allows the parties to better identify profitable investment opportunities. We use the acquisition
announcement return as our proxy for M&A quality following a large body of research (e.g.,
Asquith et al., 1983; Bradley et al., 1988; Kale et al., 2003; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Agrawal et
al., 2013; Goodman et al., 2014). In particular, following Bradley et al. (1988), Kale et al.
(2003) and Cai and Sevilir (2012), we measure portfolio cumulative abnormal returns of the
combined portfolio of the acquirer and the target around the acquisition announcement,
ANN_CAR. We obtain the announcement dates from the SDC U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions
database and estimate portfolio abnormal returns using the standard event study method
developed by Brown and Warner (1985). We use the CRSP value-weighted return as the
market return and estimate the market model parameters over the two hundred trading days
ending two months before the merger announcement.9 For each acquisition, we form a valueweighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target, with the weights based on their market
capitalization at two months prior to the acquisition announcement date. To avoid double
counting the acquirer’s existing ownership in the target, we subtract the market value of the
target equity held by the acquirer from the target’s market capitalization. We then calculate the
three-day ANN_CARs over the event window (-1, +1), where event day 0 is the acquisition
announcement date.
4.1.2. Empirical design – Common auditors and M&A quality

9

Schwert (1996) finds that, on average, the target firm stock price starts to rise about two months before the initial
bid announcement, suggesting investor anticipation or information leakage before the deal announcement. To
minimize the potential bias in estimating market model parameters, our estimation period ends two months before
the merger announcement.
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To test whether acquisitions are of higher quality in common-auditor deals than in noncommon-auditor deals, we estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model:
ANN_CAR = α + β Common auditor + γ Controls + Year FE + Industry FE + ε,

(1)

where the dependent variable, ANN_CAR, is defined above. Our main variable of interest, Common
auditor, is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target share a common auditor
and zero otherwise. We include calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed
effects, and the t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by acquirer.
Controls represents numerous control variables for auditor, firm, and deal characteristics
shown by prior research to impact M&A quality, where all of the control variables are defined in
the Appendix. Specifically, with respect to auditor characteristics, we control for whether the
acquirer and/or target have a Big 4 auditor, Big 4 Auditor, as Louis (2004) finds that acquirers
audited by non–Big 4 firms outperform those audited by Big 4 firms, and Xie et al. (2013) and
Golubov et al. (2012) show that target auditor size is associated with various deal outcomes.10
We also control for the industry dominance of auditors, Auditor industry dominance, as auditors
with more industry expertise may lead to better acquisition outcomes (Craswell et al., 1995;
Hogan and Jeter, 1999; Solomon et al., 1999; Owhoso et al., 2002). With respect to firm
characteristics, we control for Size, Operating cash flows and Tobin’s Q to capture a firm’s
growth opportunities and financing availability (Moeller et al., 2004; Dong et al., 2006). We also
include Leverage to control for creditor monitoring (Maloney et al., 1993; Masulis et al., 2007)
and Pre-announcement stock price run-up (Rosen, 2006) for both the acquirer and target.
Finally, we include several commonly used deal characteristic control variables, i.e., Relative

10

Throughout the paper, we use “Big 4” to mean Big 8, Big 6, Big 5, or Big 4 during our sample period. Big 8 (eight
largest audit firms) became Big 6 in 1989 when Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Young to form Ernst & Young
and when Deloitte, Haskins & Sells merged with Touche Ross to form Deloitte & Touche. The 1998 merger between
Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse created Big 5, and the Arthur Andersen demise in 2002 resulted in Big 4.
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deal size (Asquith et al., 1983), Percentage of stock financing (Travlos, 1987; Moeller et al.,
2004), Tender offer indicator, Hostile bid indicator (Schwert, 2000), Multiple bidders indicator
(Mitchell et al., 2004), and High-tech firms indicator (Masulis et al., 2007).
In addition to the auditor, firm and deal characteristic controls, we control for several
additional variables. In particular, Morck et al. (1990) show that when the acquirer and target
are similar, the acquisition has greater announcement returns. If firms with greater similarity
tend to hire the same accounting firm as well, firm similarity could be a correlated omitted
variable. Accordingly, we control for whether the deal is a diversifying acquisition,
Diversifying acquisition, as well as the daily stock return correlation between the acquirer and
the target prior to the acquisition announcement, Corr(stock return), following Fama and
French (1992).11
We also include several controls for M&As where the acquirer and target may already have
considerable knowledge of one another. In particular, we control for whether the acquirer and target
have had a previous business relationship (i.e., strategic alliance or joint venture) in the three years
before the acquisition, Previous business relation, as Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) find that
acquisitions generate better announcement returns if they are preceded by strategic alliance activity
between the acquirer and the target. In a similar vein, we also control for the acquirer’s equity
ownership percentage in the target before the deal announcement, Toehold.12 Finally, we control for
whether the acquirer’s headquarters are in close geographic proximity to the headquarters of the

11

We find that the mean Corr(stock return) is 0.21 (0.18) in common-auditor (non-common-auditor) deals. The difference
is significant at the 1% level, suggesting acquirers and targets display greater similarity in common-auditor deals.
12
Our results are robust if we instead define Toehold as an indicator variable for whether the acquirer owns any
equity in the target prior to the deal announcement.
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target, Local deal, as Uysal et al. (2008) find that acquirer announcement returns in local deals
are higher than those in nonlocal deals.13
4.1.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our M&A quality measure, ANN_CAR, in Panel
A as well as our control variables in Panel B. As indicated in Panel A, the mean and median
three-day ANN_CARs for the full sample are 1.91% and 1.22%, respectively, and both are
statistically significant at the 1% level. These positive portfolio returns are consistent with prior
research (e.g., Andrade et al., 2001; Wang and Xie, 2009). Columns 2 and 3 present the
subsample statistics where we split the full sample into common-auditor deals and non-commonauditor deals. As shown, the mean (median) difference in three-day ANN_CAR between
common-auditor deals and non-common-auditor deals is 1.06% (0.30%), which is statistically
significantly at the 1% (5%) level. To ensure these results are not sensitive to the length of the
return window, we also examine five-day and seven-day announcement windows and continue to
find significantly higher ANN_CARs in common-auditor deals than in non-common-auditor
deals. For our main analyses, we report the results using the three-day ANN_CAR for brevity.
As shown in Panel B of Table 2, the majority of acquirers (97%) and targets (94%) in our
sample have Big 4 auditors. Moreover, common-auditor deals are more likely than non-commonauditor deals to involve Big 4 auditors for both the acquirer and the target. Target firms’ auditors
in common-auditor deals have more industry expertise, as they are more likely to be the
dominant auditor in the two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industry. We also find
that target firms are associated with lower operating cash flows in common-auditor deals and that
such acquisitions are less likely to be hostile takeovers and less likely to have competing bidders.
13

We use the SDC database to collect zip code data for acquirer and target headquarters. When SDC zip code data
are missing, we collect the data from SEC filings on the Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
(EDGAR) database, and collect the data from Compustat for years before EDGAR.
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In addition, acquirer and target returns are more highly correlated, acquirers own more of the
targets’ stock prior to the acquisitions, and acquirer and target headquarters are more likely to be
located in the same geographical area in common-auditor deals than in non-common-auditor
deals. We control for these auditor, firm, and deal characteristics in our analyses.
4.1.4. Multivariate analysis – Common auditors and M&A quality
Table 3 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) using OLS. In Column 1, we do not
include any control variables and find that common auditors have a positive and significant effect on
ANN_CAR. In Column 2, we include auditor, firm, and deal characteristic control variables as well as
controls for firm similarity, previous business relations, and geographic proximity. Our baseline
finding continues to hold with these control variables; the coefficient estimate for Common auditor is
1.064 and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting M&As involving firms with a common
auditor have higher quality acquisitions.
The coefficients for the control variables are also consistent with findings in the literature.
For example, we observe a negative correlation between acquirer size and announcement returns
(Kimbrough and Louis, 2011; Golubov et al., 2012), acquisitions with greater relative deal size have
higher announcement returns (Louis and Sun, 2010), highly stock-financed deals are associated with
lower announcement returns (Louis, 2005), announcement returns are higher in tender offers
(Golubov et al., 2012; Cai and Sevilir, 2012), and deals in which the acquirer and the target are in
different industries are associated with lower announcement returns (Morck et al., 1990).
4.2. Common-auditor effect and uncertainty
We next examine the impact of common auditors on M&A quality conditioned on the
amount of pre-M&A uncertainty. If common auditors are associated with higher quality M&As
because they reduce uncertainty in the M&A process, then we should observe a larger common-
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auditor effect when there is a greater degree of uncertainty before the M&A. To test this
prediction, we adjust Equation (1) to include a proxy of uncertainty and interact it with the commonauditor indicator, as shown below.
ANN_CAR = β0 + β1Common auditor + β2Uncertainty + β3Common auditor*Uncertainty
+ γ Controls + Year FE + Industry FE + ε,

(2)

where ANN_CAR and Common auditor are defined previously. We predict that β3 is positive, as this
indicates that the common-auditor effect is larger when there is greater pre-M&A uncertainty.
We focus on the acquirer’s uncertainty regarding the target (rather than vice versa), because while the
target faces some uncertainty regarding its asking price and the associated contract terms, the
acquirer faces significant uncertainty regarding the target valuation in addition to determining its bid
price and associated contract terms. Moreover, while the target no longer exists after the merger, the
acquirer still faces considerable post-acquisition uncertainty associated with synergistic incorporation
of the target (as outlined in section 2). Thus, common auditors can be much more helpful for
acquirers than they can for targets in reducing uncertainty. Accordingly, we focus on uncertainty
regarding the target.
Our first proxy for uncertainty is based on the target firm’s sales growth. Smith and Watts
(1992) argue that high growth firms are associated with a higher degree of information
asymmetry. Thus, we expect uncertainty regarding the target to be more severe, and thus the
common-auditor effect on acquisition quality to be more pronounced, when the target is growing at a
more rapid pace. We define Target sales growth as the percentage change in the target’s sales from
the previous year.
Our second proxy for uncertainty is the stock return volatility of the target firm.
Estimating the true underlying value of target firms that have higher stock return volatilities is
more difficult (Officer et al., 2009; McNichols and Stubben, 2014), and common auditors could
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play a more important role in such deals. We define Target stock return volatility as the daily
stock return volatility of the target over the one-year period ending two months prior to the deal
announcement.
Our third measure of uncertainty is based on the target firm’s R&D intensity (Aboody and
Lev, 2000; Huddart and Ke, 2010; Chen et al., 2010). Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that
interpreting financial information is difficult for firms with high R&D intensity because (i) R&D
investments are more unique than investments in tangible assets, (ii) no liquid market exists for
R&D investments, and (iii) the information necessary to determine the value of assets that emerge
from R&D investments is harder to obtain. We define Target R&D intensity as the ratio of current
year R&D expenditure to sales in the year prior to the deal announcement.
Our fourth measure of uncertainty is the bid-ask spread of the target firm. The bid-ask
spread is a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry because it represents one way that
market makers protect themselves from expected losses in trading with more informed traders
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Following LaFond and Watts (2008) and Khan and Watts (2009), we
obtain daily bid-ask spread from CRSP and scale it by the midpoint of the spread. We define
Target bid-ask spread as the average of the daily spreads of the target firm over the one-year
period ending two months prior to the deal announcement. 14
Table 4 presents the results from estimating Equation (2), where the results are based on
using Target sales growth, Target stock return volatility, Target R&D intensity, and Target bid-ask
spread as proxies for uncertainty in Column 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. In particular, the coefficient
estimate for the interaction of Common auditor and the uncertainty proxies (i.e, β3) is positive and
14

Note that our uncertainty measures are potentially susceptible to endogeneity concerns. For example, target
managers’ disclosure behavior may affect the level of uncertainty measured by stock return volatility or bid ask
spread. Similarly, managers’ operating strategies may affect the firms’ sales growth or R&D intensity. If factors that
influence these decisions are correlated with the firms’ choice to use a common auditor or result in a higher
acquisition announcement return, our results may be biased.
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statistically significant at the 5% level or better across all four specifications. The evidence in Table
4 suggests that common auditors have a greater impact on M&A quality when there is more
uncertainty before the acquisition.15
4.3. Mechanisms of reductions in uncertainty
Next, we examine the three main channels through which common auditors reduce
uncertainty in the M&A process: (i) discussions with the acquirer and target regarding the M&A,
(ii) enhanced financial statement comparability, and (iii) increased reporting transparency.
4.3.1. Primary information channel - Discussions regarding M&A
The primary channel through which common auditors can reduce M&A uncertainty is via
direct discussions with the acquirer and target. As discussed in section 2, common auditors can
help reduce uncertainty throughout the M&A process, from assistance in the identification and
matching of potential M&A targets to help during the due diligence phase with valuing the target
to post-acquisition integration of information systems. Unfortunately, these discussions are not
observable; as such, we employ two different empirical approaches. First, we examine whether
the common-auditor effect is larger when the acquirer and target use the same local office of the
common auditor. The intuition is that the auditor can more easily facilitate discussions between
clients if they are in the same location as both the acquirer and the target. Second, we examine
whether there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with a common auditor. Since an
auditor is much more knowledgeable about its own clients, it can not only better match clients

15

We also test whether the sum of β2 and β3 are significant in each of the four specifications, and find that only in
the first specification (using Target sales growth) is the sum statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, there is
weak evidence that uncertainty has a positive effect on announcement returns for common-auditor M&As (as
opposed to just higher returns than those in non-common auditor M&As). One potential reason for this finding is
that to the extent auditors can better identify targets that may be undervalued more because of their inherent
uncertainty, greater target uncertainty could actually help acquirers with common auditors get better deals than they
would otherwise.
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interested in engaging in M&A transactions, but also reduce uncertainties throughout the process
that might otherwise derail the M&A. Accordingly, we predict that if common auditors help
facilitate information flow via discussions with their clients, there should be a higher probability
of an M&A with other firms that share the same auditor.
To conduct our first analysis (i.e., same-office test), we collect auditor office location
data from Audit Analytics, which provides audit office location data starting in 2002. For deals
announced before 2002 and/or with missing auditor office data in Audit Analytics, we manually
collect the data from the audit report in Form 10-K filings. Because Form 10-K filings are
unavailable in the SEC EDGAR system before 1996, our sample is reduced to 1,591
observations. Of the 1,591 observations, 459 deals (28.8%) involve a common auditor, and 120
deals (7.5%) consist of a common auditor in the same local office. Using these data, we adapt
Equation (1) by splitting Common auditor into two measures, Same-office common auditor and
Different-office common auditor, where Same-office common auditor is an indicator equal to one if
the acquirer and the target share a common auditor from the same local office and zero otherwise,
and Different-office common auditor is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer and the target share a
common auditor from different local offices and zero otherwise.
We report the results on same-office common auditors in Table 5. Column 1 reports the
results from estimating Equation (1) using the reduced sample. We find that common auditors are
associated with significantly higher combined announcement returns, consistent with the results in
Table 3. In Column 2, we report the results from estimating Equation 1, where we split Common
auditor into the two measures: Same-office common auditor and Different-office common auditor.
While the coefficients on both variables are significantly positive, the coefficient on Same-office
common auditor is greater than the coefficient on Different-office common auditor, and this
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difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. This result suggests that while common
auditors can enhance M&A quality, they are more effective at doing so when the acquirer and target
are audited by the same local audit office.
To conduct our second analysis (i.e., common-auditor M&A likelihood test), we follow a
method similar to that in Bodnaruk et al. (2009) in examining the probability of two firms
engaging in M&A activities. Specifically, for each actual acquirer, we define the set of all potential
acquirers as those covered by Compustat in the same three-digit SIC industry and of a similar size
(within a 20 percent band of market capitalization).16 We perform the same procedure for each actual
target firm and find its corresponding set of potential target firms. We then identify whether a
common auditor exists between each potential acquirer and each potential target, and we create an
indicator variable, Common auditor, that equals one if the potential acquirer and the potential target
in a given deal share the same auditor at the time of the deal announcement and zero otherwise. We
then estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one
if an acquisition takes place between the potential acquirer and the potential target and zero
otherwise.
Table 6 reports the marginal effects from estimating the probit regression. Column 1
includes only the year and industry fixed effects. In Column 2, we follow Bodnaruk et al. (2009)
and include a number of control variables, including firm size, Tobin’s Q, leverage ratio, ROA,
sales growth, stock return, stock return volatility, and industry Herfindahl index of the potential
merging firms. In both models, we find that sharing a common auditor significantly increases the
likelihood of an acquisition. After controlling for other determinants of acquisition likelihood,

16

Alternative matching based on different industry definitions (two-digit SIC industry, Fama and French 48
industries) or different size bands (10%, 30%) delivers similar results.
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sharing a common auditor increases the likelihood of an M&A between clients by 0.2 percentage
points, which is sizable given that the sample mean of the probability of an M&A is 0.7 percent.
4.3.2. Secondary information channel - Financial statement comparability
The second channel through which common auditors can reduce M&A uncertainty is via
enhanced financial statement comparability. As discussed above, because each audit firm has a
unique style of interpreting and implementing accounting rules (Francis et al., 2014; Blacconiere
et al., 2011), firms can better understand the assumptions and choices underlying accounting
numbers in financial statements from firms that share the same auditor. In turn, this leads to a
better understanding of those firms’ economics, relative to that of firms using different auditors.
To determine whether common-auditor firms engaged in an M&A have greater financial
statement comparability, we conduct two analyses. First, we use the difference in the firms’ yearspecific total accruals as a proxy for comparability following Francis et al. (2014). In particular,
we calculate the absolute value of the difference in total accruals between the acquirer and the
target in the year prior to acquisition announcement (Diff_Total_Accruals), where total accruals
are calculated as the difference between income before extraordinary items and cash flows from
operations, scaled by beginning of year total assets.17 We then regress Diff_Total_Accruals on
Common auditor and several control variables. Specifically, following Francis et al. (2014), we
control for the minimum values and differences in size, leverage, market-to-book, cash flow
from operations, losses, standard deviation of sales, standard deviation of cash flow from
operations, and standard deviation of sales growth. We also exclude financial institutions
because characteristics of accruals differ in these firms (Louis, 2004). Eliminating observations
with data restrictions and financial institutions reduces our sample size to 1,679 observations.
17

We also examine the absolute value of the difference in abnormal accruals between the acquirer and the target in
the year prior to acquisition announcement, where abnormal accruals are calculated following Kothari et al. (2005).
The untabulated results using abnormal accruals are similar to those using total accruals.
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Second, as an alternate proxy for financial statement comparability, we use the firms’
covariance of earnings across time (Barth et al., 2012; De Franco et al., 2011; Lang et al., 2010).
Specifically, we estimate the earnings co-movement between the acquirer and the target in the 16
quarters prior to acquisition announcement (ECOMP_COV), where we measure the level of
covariance as the adjusted R2 from the regression of the acquirer’s income before extraordinary
items scaled by total assets on the target’s income before extraordinary items scaled by total
assets. We then regress ECOMP_COV on Common auditor and several control variables. In
particular, we include the same control variables used in the total accruals analysis, plus we
control for cash flow comovement and return comovement across 16 consecutive quarters
(Francis et al., 2014). We require at least 10 quarters of data available for both the acquirer and
the target in estimating earnings comovement. These data restrictions reduce the sample size to
1,513 observations.18
Table 7 reports the results from the estimation of the comparability tests. In particular,
Column 1 (2) shows the results from our comparability analysis using differences in total
accruals (earnings comovement) as our proxy for financial statement comparability. As indicated
in both columns, the coefficient estimate for Common auditor is statistically significant in the
predicted directions. Specifically, in column 1, the coefficient for Common auditor (-0.020) is
negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that there are smaller differences in total
accruals between acquirers and targets in common-auditor M&As, as compared to those in noncommon-auditor M&As. In column 2, the coefficient for Common auditor (0.026) is positive and
significant at the 10% level, indicating greater earnings comovement for acquirers and targets in
common-auditor M&As relative to those in non-common-auditor M&As. Combined, the results
18

We also examine the effect of common auditors using another comparability measure developed in De Franco et
al. (2011), which is based on the similarity of the mapping of earnings to stock returns across firms. Untabulated
results using this alternative comparability measure are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7.
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in Table 7 provide support for the notion that the financial statements of acquirers and targets are
more comparable in common-auditor M&As than they are in non-common-auditor M&As.
4.3.3. Secondary information channel – Limited misreporting
The third channel through which common auditors can reduce M&A uncertainty is by
limiting misreporting and/or increasing the confidence of the acquirer (target) that the target’s
(acquirer’s) financial statements are accurate. As discussed above, both acquirers and targets
have incentives to manage earnings. Thus, auditors that audit both the acquirer and the target face
greater litigation risk as well as greater scrutiny by stakeholders, given their role as a common
agent with the opportunity for conflicts of interest. To the extent common auditors face greater
litigation (and potentially reputational) risk, they have greater incentives to limit misreporting that
asymmetrically benefits one party over the other, resulting in more transparent financial information
and reduced uncertainty.
To determine whether there is less misreporting for common-auditor M&As relative to
non-common-auditor M&As, we use performance-matched abnormal accruals (Kothari et al.,
2005) and financial statement restatements (Bens et al., 2012) as proxies for misreporting. For
the accrual analysis, we examine both acquirer and target accruals; however, for the restatement
analysis, we examine restatements made by the newly merged firm. Since our sample of
acquisitions consists of acquirers obtaining 100% ownership, the new company is a combination
of the acquirer and target. As such, when a restatement is announced, we cannot identify whether
it was the acquirer or the target that initiated the earnings management. That is, the restatements
are announced for the new company rather than the acquirer or target separately, as consolidated
statements are presented for those earlier (pre-M&A) years.
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For our first misreporting analysis, we estimate quarterly unexpected accruals in the spirit
of Erickson and Wang (1999). Following Louis (2004) and Gong et al. (2008), we focus on
current accruals because long-term accruals are less susceptible to manipulation in the short run
(Healy, 1985). Following the suggestion of Kothari et al. (2005), we control for firm
performance by matching on contemporaneous ROA (calculated as income before extraordinary
items scaled by lagged total assets). 19 Specifically, quarterly unexpected accruals are the
residuals from the estimation of the following model:
CACCit /ATit-1 = α11/AT it-1 + α2∆REVit /AT it-1 + α3Q1 + α4Q2 + α5Q3 + α6Q4 + Year FE + εit,

(3)

where CACCit represents current accruals for firm i in quarter t, ATit-1 is total assets for firm i in
quarter t-1, ∆REVit is the change in revenue for firm i in quarter t, and Q1 (Q2, Q3, Q4) is an indicator
that equals one for the first (second, third, fourth) fiscal quarter and zero otherwise. All indicator
variables are deflated by lagged total assets. We estimate the model for each two-digit SIC industry.
We follow Erickson and Wang (1999) and focus on three quarters, q-2, q-1, and q0, where q0 is the last
quarter for which earnings are announced prior to the acquisition announcement. Unexpected
accruals (UA), our proxy for earnings management, is the sum of q-2, q-1, and q0 unexpected accruals
minus unexpected accruals of the industry-and-performance-matched firm.20
Table 8 provides the results from regressing UA on the Common auditor indicator. We
report the acquirers’ UA in Columns 1 and 2 and targets’ UA in Columns 3 and 4. We include only
year and industry fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, and we include the full set of control variables
19

As Kothari et al. (2005, p. 166) note, “[D]iscretionary accruals estimated using the Jones or the modified-Jones
model, and adjusted for a performance-matched firm’s discretionary accrual, tend to be the best specified measures
of discretionary accruals across a wide variety of simulated event conditions…[M]atching on ROAt produces less
misspecified tests because the performance-related error in estimating the discretionary accrual of a treatment firms
affects the treatment firm’s ROAt , which is matched with a control firm’s ROAt. Thus, the impact of performancerelated accrual on the properties of subsequent period’s estimated discretionary accrual of the treatment firm is
better controlled for when matching is on ROAt than by matching on a lagged (i.e., stale) determinant, ROAt-1.”
20
In untabulated analyses, we also use annual unexpected accruals and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals
quality measure as proxies for misreporting, and our results are qualitatively similar.
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(as in Equation (1)) in Columns 2 and 4. The number of observations for this analysis is smaller
(i.e., 1,526 obs. and 1,508 obs. in the acquirer and target analyses, respectively) than that used in
our main analyses because we exclude financial firms for this analysis and unexpected accruals are
not estimable for some observations due to data restrictions. The coefficient estimates for Common
auditor are negative and statistically significant in Columns 1 and 2, supporting our conjecture that
acquirers engage in less earnings management prior to the acquisition when they share a common
auditor with the target. While the coefficient estimates for Common auditor are also negative in
Columns 3 and 4, they are statistically insignificant. 21 Erickson and Wang (1999) show that
acquiring firms manage earnings upward in the three quarters prior to the merger, but they do not
find evidence of earnings management in target firms, potentially because many target firms often
have little time to respond to M&A offers. Thus, our weaker findings for the disciplining effect of
common auditors on misreporting by targets may be a function of lower power.
For our second misreporting analysis, we examine whether the merging firms are less
likely to restate earnings if the acquirer and the target share a common auditor. We focus on
restatements filed by the newly merged firm for misreporting made within two years before the
merger completion. This two-year window generally covers the fiscal year prior to the merger
announcement as well as the fiscal year between the merger announcement and the deal
completion, as more than 90 percent of the acquisitions in our sample complete the deal within one
year from the merger announcement.
We collect earnings restatements from Audit Analytics. Scholz (2008) argues that Audit
Analytics is a more expansive database than other restatement data sources, as the Audit
21

Our results for acquirer unexpected accruals are largely driven by stock-for-stock deals. Untabulated results show
that if we restrict the analysis to stock deals (882 out of 1,526 deals in Table 8), the coefficient on Common auditor
is -0.034 and statistically significant at the five percent level, while the coefficient is -0.007 and statistically
insignificant in all-cash deals (644 deals). For our target unexpected accruals analysis, the coefficient on Common
auditor is still insignificant in both stock and cash deals (860 and 648 out of 1,508 deals in Table 8, respectively).

27

Analytics software extracts information from all EDGAR filings, which leads to a more efficient
identification of restatements filed without being announced in a press release or a Form 8-K.
Audit Analytics includes only restatements that correct misstated financial statements and
exclude other financial statement changes. Following Bens et al. (2012), we eliminate all clerical
application errors and include only accounting rule application failures and financial fraud to
ensure that our sample includes material GAAP misapplications and not unintentional reporting
errors. We use information about the beginning date of the misstatement period to identify
earnings misstatements within a two-year window before the merger completion.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 8 present the marginal effects from the probit regression of
Restatement on Common auditor without and with control variables, respectively, where
Restatement is an indicator that equals one if the beginning date of the misstatement period
falls within a two-year window before the merger completion and zero otherwise. The number
of observations for this analysis drops to 1,356 because the coverage of restatements in Audit
Analytics starts in 1996 and we use a two-year window to identify misreporting before the deal
completion. As indicated in Column 5 (6), a common auditor M&A is associated with a 3.4
(3.1) percentage point reduction in the likelihood of earnings restatements, as compared to a
non-common-auditor M&A, and this marginal effect is statistically significant at the 5% (10%)
level. Given that the sample mean of the restatement probability is 8.04 percent, the effect of
common auditors in reducing the restatement probability is economically meaningful.
Combined, the results in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 support our inferences that common auditors
reduce uncertainty in the M&A process by improving (public and private) communication
channels.
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5. Additional analyses
5.1. Strategic selection of auditor
One potential concern with our finding is the endogenous choice of auditors by the acquirer
and the target. In particular, either party may strategically hire a common auditor prior to the
acquisition announcement to influence deal outcomes or for other reasons that lead to better
M&A outcomes. To address this potential issue, we examine the tenure of the auditor. Our
intuition is that for auditor selection to be a concern, there must be a change in auditor shortly
before the acquisition. That is, it’s highly unlikely that firms switch auditors many years before
an intended M&A to obtain the benefits of having a common auditor.
We find that acquirer (target) auditors have an average tenure of 10.06 (7.23) years in
common-auditor deals and 9.79 (7.46) years in non-common-auditor deals. Further, the acquirer
(target) auditor's tenure is less than three years in 15.2% (18.3%) of the common-auditor sample, and
in 16.5% (19.0%) of the non-common-auditor sample. So, merging firms do not appear to
strategically select auditors for M&As. Nonetheless, we address the concern of strategic auditor
selection using two additional tests. First, we create indicator variables that equal one if the acquirer’s
or target’s auditor has a tenure less than three years and zero otherwise, then include interaction terms
of Common auditor and these two indicator variables. If firms are being strategic in the appointment
of common auditors, we should expect the common-auditor effect on M&A outcomes to be more
pronounced for shorter-tenured auditors. In untabulated results neither of the interaction terms is
significant, and the coefficient of Common auditor continues to be positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. Second, we rerun our analysis on a subsample of acquisitions in which
both the acquirer’s auditor and the target’s auditor have been with the firms for at least three years.
The untabulated result is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those with the full sample.22
22

Our results are robust if we define short-tenured auditor as the ones whose tenure is less than or equal to one year
prior to deal announcement.
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5.2. Non-market based M&A quality measures
In our main analyses, we use the acquisition announcement return as our proxy for M&A
quality. In this section, we use two non-market based measures that have also been used in the
literature for M&A quality: (1) post-acquisition change in ROA, ∆ROA, (Healy et al., 1992;
Chen et al., 2007; Wang and Xie, 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Fu et al., 2013; Goodman et al., 2014),
and (2) the probability of a post-acquisition goodwill impairment, Prob_GW_Impair (Doellman
and Ryngaert, 2010; Gu and Lev, 2011; Goodman et al., 2014). The advantages of these
measures are that they are not as susceptible to market biases and they represent ex post (as
opposed to ex ante) measures of M&A quality. ROA represents the actual economic benefits
generated by the assets, as opposed to the market’s perception of the increase in value. Further, a
goodwill impairment recorded in the post-acquisition period represents instances where the
premium paid for the target’s assets is no longer justified. However, the main drawback of these
measures lies in the difficulty in isolating the performance effects directly related to the
acquisition from those of the rest of the firm. Therefore, we focus on acquisition announcement
returns in our main analyses and provide supporting evidence using these ex post, non-market
based measures in this section.
We rerun our main analyses, i.e., Equations (1) and (2), where we substitute ∆ROA and
Prob_GW_Impair as the dependent variables and estimate the models using OLS estimation and
a probit regression, respectively. ∆ROA is measured as the three-year change in ROA, and
Prob_GW_Impair is an indicator equal to one if there is a goodwill impairment in the three-year
period following an acquisition that generates a large increase in goodwill (i.e., an increase
in goodwill greater or equal to 1% of total assets), and zero otherwise. Due to data
restrictions, our change in ROA sample declines from 1,971 to 1,684, but there is no sample
attrition for the goodwill impairment analysis. In untabulated results, we find that when we
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rerun Equation (1) with our non-market based M&A quality measures, the coefficient estimate for
Common auditor is positive (negative) and statistically significant at the 1% level (10% level) when
using ∆ROA (Prob_GW_Impair), consistent with our expectations and the results in Table 3 that
common-auditor M&As are higher quality than non-common-auditor M&As. When we rerun our
uncertainty analysis (Equation (2)), we find that the interaction coefficient estimate, β3, is
positive and statistically significant in three of the four specifications using ∆ROA. Further, the
coefficient estimate for β3 is negative across all four specifications using Prob_GW_Impair,
suggesting a lower likelihood of post-acquisition goodwill impairments for common-auditor
acquisitions with more uncertainty; however, the coefficients are not statistically significant.
Collectively, this evidence, along with that in Tables 3 and 4, suggests that common auditors
have a greater impact on M&A quality when there is more uncertainty before the acquisition.
5.3. The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Section 201 of SOX increased restrictions on non-audit services, such as M&A advisory and
consulting services, provided by independent auditors in an attempt to strengthen auditor
independence. To the extent auditors were engaged in non-audit services before SOX and
common auditors used these services to help their clients engage in better acquisitions, the
common-auditor effect should be mitigated post-SOX. To examine this possibility, we partition
our sample into pre- and post-SOX subperiods and rerun our analyses. We classify transactions
announced between January 1988 and July 2002 (when SOX was enacted) as deals in the pre-SOX
period, and those announced between August 2002 and December 2010 as deals in the post-SOX
period. Untabulated results show that the common-auditor effect on acquisition announcement
returns is similar between the pre- and post-SOX periods, suggesting that the higher quality M&As
associated with common auditors are a result of reductions in uncertainty from (perhaps
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informal) communications within the audit function rather than those within non-audit functions.
An alternative possibility is that these communications shifted from non-audit functions to
informal discussions within the audit function after SOX. We cannot rule out this possibility.
5.4. Shared investment banks and shared directors
Agrawal et al. (2013) and Cai and Sevilir (2012) show that shared investment banks and
interlocked directors influence acquisition outcomes. To examine whether the common-auditor
effect is incremental to the effects of shared investment banks or shared directors, we include a
shared investment bank indicator and the shared director indicator in our model. Among our
sample of 1,971 acquisitions, only five deals (0.25%) have shared investment banks, consistent
with Agrawal et al. (2013), who also report a very low percentage of shared investment banks, i.e.,
98 out of 6,272 deals (1.6%). Further, among our sample of 961 deals with available data on shared
directors, 93 deals (9.7%) have shared director, which is comparable to the 9.4% reported in Cai
and Sevilir (2012).23 Untabulated results show that the coefficient on Common auditor remains
positive and statistically significant even after we control for the shared investment bank indicator
or the shared director indicator, suggesting that the common-auditor effect is incremental to the
effect of shared directors and shared investment banks.
5.5. Impact of specific auditors
In our final analysis, we examine whether a particular auditor or subset of auditors drive
the acquisition announcement returns in our main analyses. For example, Louis (2005) finds that
acquirers audited by non-Big 4 accounting firms outperform those audited by Big 4 firms.
Further, with the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002, many firms switched auditors and may
have strategically selected auditors based, in part, on their ability to help with upcoming M&As.
We do not include these related control variables in our main analyses, because there is such a significant drop
(roughly 50%) in our sample size as a result of data restrictions on the shared director variable.
23
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Accordingly, we conduct three tests. First, we restrict our sample to Big 4 clients only, which
results in a sample of 1,813 observations. Second, we remove deals with Andersen clients
(acquirer or target) in years 2001 and 2002. In both tests, our results continue to hold at the 1% level.
Finally, we examine whether the common-auditor effect on announcement returns is
stronger for one of the largest eight auditors in the sample (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst &
Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, Arthur Andersen, Grant Thornton, BDO Seidman, or Crowe
Chizek & Company). Specifically, we include an interaction term, where we interact Common
auditor with an indicator for a specific auditor. While Common auditor remains positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level, none of the interaction terms are significant, suggesting
that the common-auditor effect is not stronger for any particular auditor.

6. Conclusion
The acquisition process often involves significant uncertainty, which can negatively
impact M&A quality by reducing managers’ ability to identify the most profitable investment
projects. This paper examines whether M&A quality is higher when acquirers and targets share
the same external auditor. Given their considerable knowledge regarding both the acquirer and
the target, common auditors can help reduce uncertainty, and thus improve M&A quality, via (i)
direct communications with the merging parties, (ii) enhanced financial statement comparability,
and (iii) limiting misreporting.
Using the acquisition announcement return to capture M&A quality, we find that M&As
involving firms with a common auditor are of higher quality than M&As involving firms with
different auditors. We also find that the common-auditor effect is stronger when there is greater
pre-acquisition uncertainty. Collectively, these results are consistent with common auditors
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reducing uncertainty during the M&A process, which leads to higher quality M&As. We then
provide evidence on the three mechanisms through which common auditors reduce M&A
uncertainty. With respect to the first mechanism, i.e., direct communications with the parties, we
show the common-auditor effect is larger when the acquirer and target use the same local office
of the common auditor, and we show there is an increased probability of an M&A for firms with
a common auditor. We then show that acquirers and targets with common auditors have more
comparable financial statements (i.e., second mechanism) and less misreporting (i.e., third
mechanism) than do those with different auditors. Combined, these results support our inferences
that common auditors reduce uncertainty in the M&A process, leading to higher quality M&As.
Our study contributes along several dimensions. First, we contribute to the literature that
examines the role of acquirer auditors or target auditors in M&As by providing new insights into
the role of common auditors in M&As. Second, our study contributes to the literature on the real
effects of accounting and auditing by showing that common auditors reduce uncertainty in the
M&A process, and thus improve M&A quality. Third, we contribute to the large literature
examining the effect of sharing an agent on economic outcomes by providing evidence on the
impact of sharing an auditor on M&A outcomes. Finally, we complement concurrent work by
Dhaliwal et al. (2014), who also examine the role of common auditors in M&A outcomes. While
we show that common auditors are associated with higher quality M&As, Dhaliwal et al. (2014)
find that the benefits accrue to the acquirers at the target’s expense. Further, they focus on the
role of auditor quality in mitigating the conflict of interest, while we explore the mechanisms
through which common auditors impact M&A outcomes and the role of pre-M&A uncertainty in
that relation.
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Appendix. Variable definitions
Variable
Definition
Panel A: Measures of acquisition performance
ANN_CAR
Cumulative abnormal percentage return for a value-weighted
portfolio of the acquirer and the target using the market model
estimated using the return data of two hundred trading days
ending two months before the announcement date. The weights
are based on the market capitalizations of the acquirer and the
target at two months prior to the deal announcement. The
target’s weight is adjusted for the acquirer’s toehold.
∆ROA
The change in income before extraordinary items scaled by
assets from three years before the acquisition announcement to
three years after the acquisition completion.
Prob_GW_Impair
Indicator variable equals one if a firm records goodwill
impairment losses in the three-year period following an
acquisition that generates a large increase in goodwill, and
zero otherwise. A large increase in goodwill is defined as an
increase in goodwill greater or equal to 1 percent of total
assets.
Panel B: Auditor characteristics
Common auditor
Indicator variable equals one if the acquirer and the target share
the same audit firm and zero otherwise.
Big 4 auditor
Indicator variable equals one if the firm is audited by a Big 4
accounting firm and zero otherwise.
Auditor industry
Indicator variable equals one if the auditor is the largest auditor
dominance
based on clients’ assets in the two-digit SIC industry and its
market share is at least 10% greater than that of the second
auditor and zero otherwise.
Panel C: Acquirer and target firm characteristics
Firm size
Market value of equity in millions calculated as the number of
shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at two months
prior to the deal announcement. Natural logarithm of the market
value of equity is used in regressions.
Sales minus the cost of goods sold, selling and general
Operating cash
flows
administrative expenses, and working capital change, scaled by
book value of assets.
Tobin’s Q
Market value of assets over book value of assets.
Leverage
Book value of debt over book value of assets.
Pre-announcement Buy-and-hold abnormal returns during the two hundred trading
stock price-run-up days ending two months before the announcement date with
CRSP value-weighted return as the market index.
Panel D: Deal characteristics
Relative deal size
Deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of equity.
Percentage of
Percentage of financing with stocks.
stock financing
Tender offer
Indicator variable equals one for tender offers and zero
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Data source
CRSP

Compustat

Compustat

Compustat
Compustat
Compustat

CRSP

Compustat

Compustat
Compustat
CRSP

SDC, CRSP
SDC
SDC

Hostile
Multiple bidders
High-tech firms

otherwise.
Indicator variable equals one if the bid is hostile and zero
otherwise.
Indicator variable equals one if there is more than one bidder
and zero otherwise.
Indicator variable equals one if the acquirer and the target are
both from the high-tech industries as defined in Loughran and
Ritter (2004) and zero otherwise.

Panel E: Additional controls
Diversifying
Indicator variable equals one if the acquirer and the target do not
acquisition
share the same two-digit SIC code and zero otherwise.
Corr(stock return) Correlation of stock returns between the acquirer and the target
during the six-month period ending two months prior to the deal
announcement.
Previous business
Indicator variable equals one if strategic alliances or joint
relation
ventures exist between the acquirer and the target in the three
years prior to the deal announcement and zero otherwise.
Toehold
Acquirer’s percentage equity ownership in the target firm prior
to the deal announcement.
Local deal
Indicator variable equals one if the acquirer’s headquarters is
located within 100 kilometers of the target’s headquarters and
zero otherwise.
Panel F: Uncertainty proxies
Target sales growth Percentage change in sales from the previous year.
Target stock return Daily stock return volatility over the one-year period ending two
volatility
months prior to the deal announcement.
Target R&D
R&D expenditure scaled by sales.
intensity
Average of daily bid-ask spreads (scaled by the midpoint of the
Target Bid-ask
spread
spread) over the one-year period ending two months prior to the
deal announcement.
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SDC
SDC
SDC

SDC
CRSP

SDC

SDC
SDC, Form
10-K,
Compustat

Compustat
CRSP
Compustat
CRSP

Table 1: Sample distribution
This table presents the distribution of sample acquisitions by announcement year and by acquirer Fama
and French 48 industry classification, respectively. Numbers for the full sample are presented first,
followed by subsamples based on whether the acquirer and the target share a common auditor around the
acquisition announcement. Common-auditor deals are the acquisition transactions in which the acquirer
and the target share the same audit firm. Non-common-auditor deals are the transactions without shared
auditors.
Panel A: By announcement year

Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

Full sample
44
40
35
25
25
39
58
114
122
164
171
173
167
108
67
81
74
84
108
97
53
63
59
1,971

Common-auditor deals
Number
Percentage
7
15.9
9
22.5
9
25.7
7
28.0
8
32.0
9
23.1
9
15.5
30
26.3
37
30.3
54
32.9
38
22.2
52
30.1
51
30.5
34
31.5
15
22.4
18
22.2
24
32.4
27
32.1
25
23.1
29
29.9
11
20.8
24
38.1
20
33.9
547
27.8
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Non-common-auditor deals
Number
Percentage
37
84.1
31
77.5
26
74.3
18
72.0
17
68.0
30
76.9
49
84.5
84
73.7
85
69.7
110
67.1
133
77.8
121
69.9
116
69.5
74
68.5
52
77.6
63
77.8
50
67.6
57
67.9
83
76.9
68
70.1
42
79.2
39
61.9
39
66.1
1,424
72.2

Panel B: By acquirer Fama and French 48 industry classification
Industry
Agriculture
Food products
Candy and soda
Beer and liquor
Tobacco products
Recreation
Entertainment
Printing and publishing
Consumer goods
Apparel
Health care
Medical equipment
Pharmaceutical products
Chemicals
Rubber and plastic products
Textiles
Construction materials
Construction
Steel works etc.
Fabricated products
Machinery
Electrical equipment
Automobiles and trucks
Aircraft
Shipbuilding, railroad equipment
Defense
Precious metals
Mining
Coal
Petroleum and natural gas
Utilities
Communication
Personal services
Business services
Computers
Electronic equipment
Measuring/control equipment
Business supplies
Shipping containers
Transportation
Wholesale
Retail
Restaurants, hotels, motels
Banking
Insurance
Real estate
Trading
Other
Total

Full sample
3
22
4
2
2
21
26
16
28
11
45
78
117
36
8
5
24
14
26
6
51
15
20
8
7
4
9
3
2
96
58
93
12
304
244
17
67
20
3
24
49
74
28
72
90
4
91
12
1,971

Common-auditor deals
Number
Percentage
0
0.0
4
18.2
1
25.0
0
0.0
2
100.0
5
23.8
4
15.4
1
6.3
6
21.4
0
0.0
15
33.3
30
38.5
28
23.9
8
22.2
1
12.5
3
60.0
6
25.0
4
28.6
5
19.2
0
0.0
16
31.4
5
33.3
5
25.0
0
0.0
5
71.4
0
0.0
4
44.4
1
33.3
1
50.0
22
22.9
27
46.6
22
23.7
1
8.3
70
23.0
70
28.7
6
35.3
16
23.9
8
40.0
2
66.7
10
41.7
9
18.4
19
25.7
13
46.4
23
31.9
31
34.4
2
50.0
33
36.3
3
25.0
547
27.8
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Non-common-auditor deals
Number
Percentage
3
100.0
18
81.8
3
75.0
2
100.0
0
0.0
16
76.2
22
84.6
15
93.8
22
78.6
11
100.0
30
66.7
48
61.5
89
76.1
28
77.8
7
87.5
2
40.0
18
75.0
10
71.4
21
80.8
6
100.0
35
68.6
10
66.7
15
75.0
8
100.0
2
28.6
4
100.0
5
55.6
2
66.7
1
50.0
74
77.1
31
53.4
71
76.3
11
91.7
234
77.0
174
71.3
11
64.7
51
76.1
12
60.0
1
33.3
14
58.3
40
81.6
55
74.3
15
53.6
49
68.1
59
65.6
2
50.0
58
63.7
9
75.0
1,424
72.2

Table 2: Descriptive statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of announcement returns and control variables. All variables
are defined in Appendix. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Panel A: Announcement returns

ANN_CAR[-1,+1]
ANN_CAR[-2,+2]
ANN_CAR[-3,+3]

(1)
Full Sample
(N=1,971)
Mean
Median
1.91*** 1.22***
1.97*** 1.29***
1.99*** 1.18***

(2)
Common-auditor Deals
(N=547)
Mean
Median
2.67***
1.44***
2.74***
1.73***
2.89***
1.66***

(3)
Non-common-auditor Deals
(N=1,424)
Mean
Median
1.61***
1.14***
1.68***
1.18***
1.65***
1.00***

(2)-(3)

Mean
1.06***
1.06***
1.24***

Median
0.30**
0.54**
0.66**

Panel B: Control variables
Full sample
Variable
Auditor characteristics
Acquirer Big 4 auditor
Target Big 4 auditor
Acquirer auditor industry
dominance
Target auditor industry
dominance
Acquirer characteristics
Firm size
Operating cash flows
Tobin’s Q
Leverage
Pre-announcement stock
price-run-up
Target characteristics
Firm size
Operating cash flows
Tobin’s Q
Leverage
Pre-announcement stock
price-run-up

Mean

S.D.

Median

P25

P75

Commonauditor
deals

Noncommonauditor deals

Difference

0.97
0.94

0.18
0.23

1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00

0.98
0.98

0.96
0.93

0.02**
0.05***

0.14

0.35

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.16

0.14

0.02

0.12

0.33

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.17

0.11

0.06***

8,990
0.12
2.30
0.21

20,909
0.10
1.86
0.18

1,743
0.12
1.69
0.18

461
0.07
1.23
0.06

6,398
0.18
2.59
0.33

9,095
0.12
2.27
0.22

8,949
0.12
2.30
0.21

146
-0.01
-0.03
0.01

0.07

0.35

0.02

-0.13

0.18

0.08

0.07

0.01

870
0.07
1.99
0.22

1,929
0.16
1.61
0.22

196
0.10
1.44
0.16

62
0.03
1.10
0.02

727
0.15
2.16
0.36

915
0.06
1.92
0.22

853
0.08
2.02
0.22

62
-0.02**
-0.09
0.01

0.00

0.40

-0.05

-0.25

0.17

0.00

-0.01

0.01

Deal characteristics
Relative deal size
Percentage of stock
financing
Tender offer
Hostile bid
Multiple bidders
High-tech firms

0.49

0.96

0.20

0.07
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0.49

0.49

0.00

46.91
0.24
0.02
0.06
0.29

45.01
0.42
0.14
0.23
0.45

45.64
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

46.20
0.22
0.01
0.04
0.29

47.19
0.24
0.02
0.07
0.29

-0.99
-0.02
-0.01*
-0.03**
0.00

Additional controls
Diversifying acquisition
Corr(stock return)
Previous business relation
Toehold
Local deal

0.35
0.19
0.02
3.12
0.19

0.48
0.20
0.12
11.31
0.39

0.00
0.15
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
0.29
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.34
0.21
0.01
4.86
0.27

0.35
0.18
0.02
2.45
0.16

-0.02
0.03***
0.00
2.41***
0.11***
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Table 3: Common auditors and acquisition announcement returns
This table presents results from the regression of acquisition announcement returns. The dependent variable is
ANN_CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns of the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target from
one day before to one day after the deal announcement. The other variables are defined in Appendix. All the
regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects
whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Variable
Common auditor

(1)
1.166***
(2.967)

Auditor characteristics
Acquirer Big 4 auditor

(2)
1.064***
(2.911)
-1.109
(-1.027)
0.400
(0.645)
0.033
(0.064)
-0.077
(-0.154)

Target Big 4 auditor
Acquirer auditor industry dominance
Target auditor industry dominance
Acquirer and target firm characteristics
Acquirer size

-0.742***
(-5.959)
1.940
(0.888)
-0.052
(-0.386)
2.018*
(1.906)
-1.058
(-1.631)
-0.155
(-0.113)
-0.164
(-1.069)
-2.537***
(-2.972)
-0.525
(-1.151)

Acquirer Operating cash flows
Acquirer Tobin’s Q
Acquirer leverage
Acquirer pre-announcement stock price-run-up
Target Operating cash flows
Target Tobin’s Q
Target leverage
Target pre-announcement stock price-run-up
Deal characteristics
Relative deal size

1.387***
(6.200)
-0.033***
(-7.687)
1.028**
(2.320)
2.792**
(2.399)

Percentage of stock financing
Tender offer
Hostile bid
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0.307
(0.402)
-0.774
(-1.240)

Multiple bidders
High-tech firms
Additional controls
Diversifying acquisition

-0.861**
(-2.374)
2.176**
(2.091)
-0.002
(-0.109)
0.598
(0.676)
0.267
(0.649)

Corr(stock return)
Previous business relation
Toehold
Local deal

Year fixed effect
Industry fixed effect
Observations
Adj. R-squared

Yes
Yes
1,971
0.004
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Yes
Yes
1,971
0.199

Table 4: Common-auditor effect and target uncertainty
This table presents regression results with interaction terms of common auditor and target uncertainty
proxies. The dependent variable is ANN_CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns of the value-weighted
portfolio of the acquirer and the target from one day before to one day after the deal announcement. The other
variables are defined in Appendix. All the regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects and
Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level,
respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Variable
Common auditor
Common auditor * Target sales growth
Target sales growth

(1)
0.785**
(2.117)
0.928**
(2.026)
-0.044
(-1.225)

Common auditor * Target stock return volatility

(2)
-0.823
(-1.057)

(3)
0.992***
(2.702)

49.922**
(2.327)
-29.836**
(-2.373)

Target stock return volatility
Common auditor * Target R&D intensity

0.158***
(3.814)
-0.134***
(-3.923)

Target R&D intensity
Common auditor * Target bid-ask spread

37.430**
(2.532)
-16.330*
(-1.764)

Target bid-ask spread

Controls
Year fixed effect
Industry fixed effect
Observations
Adj. R-squared

(4)
-0.852
(-1.148)

Yes
Yes
Yes
1,971
0.196
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Yes
Yes
Yes
1,971
0.199

Yes
Yes
Yes
1,971
0.197

Yes
Yes
Yes
1,971
0.199

Table 5: Analyses of same-office common auditors
This table presents results from the regression of acquisition announcement returns on same- and
different-office common auditor indicators. The dependent variable is ANN_CAR, the cumulative
abnormal returns of the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target from one day before to one
day after the deal announcement. Same-office common auditor is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer
and the target share a common auditor from the same local office and zero otherwise, and Different-office
common auditor is an indicator equal to one if the acquirer and the target share a common auditor from
different local offices and zero otherwise. The other variables are defined in Appendix. All the
regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects
whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, based on two-tailed
tests.
Variable
Common auditor

(1)
1.125***
(3.413)

(2)

1.976***
(3.389)
0.873**
(2.347)

Same-office common auditor
Different-office common auditor
Auditor characteristics
Acquirer Big 4 auditor
Target Big 4 auditor
Acquirer auditor industry dominance
Target auditor industry dominance
Acquirer and target firm characteristics
Acquirer size
Acquirer Operating cash flows
Acquirer Tobin’s Q
Acquirer leverage
Acquirer pre-announcement stock price-run-up
Target Operating cash flows
Target Tobin’s Q
Target leverage
Target pre-announcement stock price-run-up
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-1.097
(-1.334)
0.273
(0.472)
-0.122
(-0.284)
-0.275
(-0.630)

-1.093
(-1.325)
0.290
(0.501)
-0.112
(-0.261)
-0.261
(-0.597)

-0.644***
(-5.835)
-0.095
(-0.857)
1.695*
(1.709)
1.325
(0.697)
-0.149
(-0.268)
0.016
(0.120)
-1.573**
(-2.068)
0.500
(0.401)
-0.550
(-1.228)

-0.639***
(-5.782)
-0.092
(-0.840)
1.689*
(1.705)
1.294
(0.682)
-0.150
(-0.270)
0.015
(0.115)
-1.562**
(-2.053)
0.455
(0.367)
-0.551
(-1.231)

Deal characteristics
Relative deal size
Percentage of stock financing
Tender offer
Hostile bid
Multiple bidders
High-tech firms
Additional controls
Diversifying acquisition
Corr(stock return)
Previous business relation
Toehold
Local deal

0.899***
(4.455)
-0.030***
(-7.309)
0.537
(1.394)
1.117
(0.925)
0.550
(0.703)
-0.648
(-1.166)

0.901***
(4.457)
-0.030***
(-7.331)
0.524
(1.359)
1.183
(0.979)
0.558
(0.709)
-0.650
(-1.171)

-0.432
(-1.322)
1.716*
(1.876)
0.567
(0.509)
0.006
(0.417)
0.402
(1.078)

-0.425
(-1.301)
1.702*
(1.857)
0.602
(0.545)
0.003
(0.191)
0.119
(0.289)

Test: Same-office common auditor
= Different-office common auditor

F-statistic = 2.80
Prob > F = 0.0945

Year fixed effect
Industry fixed effect
Observations
Adj. R-squared

Yes
Yes
1,591
0.183
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Yes
Yes
1,591
0.184

Table 6: Common auditors and M&A likelihood
This table presents probit regression results of the probability of merger and acquisition (M&A)
transactions (marginal effect reported). For each acquirer (target), we define the set of all potential
acquirer (target) firms as the ones in the same three-digit standard industrial classification industry with
similar size (within 20 percent band of market capitalization). Our dependent variable is an indicator
variable that equals one if an M&A transaction takes place between the potential acquirer and the
potential target and zero otherwise. ROA is operating income before depreciation, scaled by book value of
total assets. Stock return is stock returns over the one-year period ending two months prior to the deal
announcement. Industry Herfindahl is the sum of the squares of the sales market shares over all firms
within the industry. The other variables are defined in Appendix. All the regressions include controls for
calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects whose coefficients are
suppressed for brevity. Z-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980)
and firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Variable
Common auditor

(1)
0.003***
(8.199)

Acquirer characteristics
Acquirer size

(2)
0.002***
(7.223)
0.001***
(9.507)
-0.000
(-0.732)
-0.001*
(-1.764)
0.001
(1.543)
0.000**
(2.281)
0.000*
(1.791)
-0.030***
(-4.051)
-0.027***
(-2.688)

Acquirer Tobin’s Q
Acquirer leverage
Acquirer ROA
Acquirer sales growth
Acquirer stock return
Acquirer stock return volatility
Acquirer industry Herfindahl
Target characteristics
Target size

0.001***
(5.147)
-0.000**
(-2.409)
0.000
(0.867)
0.001**
(2.432)
-0.001***
(-4.331)
-0.000
(-1.484)
-0.005
(-0.939)

Target Tobin’s Q
Target leverage
Target ROA
Target sales growth
Target stock return
Target stock return volatility
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0.047***
(7.236)

Target industry Herfindahl

Yes
Yes
232,604
0.192

Year fixed effect
Industry fixed effect
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
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Yes
Yes
232,604
0.237

Table 7: Common auditors and financial statement comparability
This table presents regression results of financial statement comparability measures. The dependent variable
in Column 1 is Diff_Total_Accruals, the absolute value of the difference in total accruals between the
acquirer and the target in the year prior to acquisition announcement, where total accruals are calculated as
the difference between income before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations, scaled by
beginning of year total assets. The dependent variable in Column 2 is ECOMP_COV, the earnings comovement between the acquirer and the target in the 16 quarters prior to acquisition announcement. In the
total accruals difference regression, we control for the minimum value of and the difference in size,
leverage, market-to-book, cash flow from operations, losses, standard deviation of sales, standard deviation
of cash flow from operations, and standard deviation of sales growth. In the earnings comovement
regression, we also control for cash flow comovement and return comovement across 16 consecutive
quarters. Refer to Francis et al. (2014) for definitions of control variables. All the regressions include
controls for calendar year fixed effects and Fama and French 48 industry fixed effects whose coefficients are
suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and
firm clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent level, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.

Variable
Common auditor
Size_diff
Size_min
LEV_diff
LEV_min
MB_diff
MB_min
CFO_diff
CFO_min
LossProb_diff
LossProb_min
STD_Sales_diff
STD_Sales_min
STD_CFO_diff
STD_CFO_min

(1)
Diff_Total_Accruals
-0.020**
(-2.215)
-0.006
(-1.490)
-0.004
(-0.808)
0.041
(1.165)
-0.000
(-0.014)
0.010
(1.286)
-0.004
(-0.582)
0.380***
(4.893)
0.043
(0.500)
0.023
(1.538)
0.030
(1.094)
-0.000
(-1.214)
-0.000
(-0.438)
0.000
(0.916)
-0.000
(-0.120)
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(2)
ECOMP_COV
0.026*
(1.742)
0.008
(1.270)
0.002
(0.255)
-0.092**
(-2.202)
-0.024
(-0.456)
-0.010*
(-1.837)
0.001
(0.067)

-0.046
(-1.601)
0.005
(0.134)
-0.000**
(-2.047)
0.000
(0.807)
-0.000
(-0.625)
0.000
(0.783)

STD_Sales_Grth_diff
STD_Sales_Grth_min

-0.007*
(-1.788)
0.141***
(3.070)

-0.006
(-1.016)
0.046
(0.650)
0.090**
(2.261)
0.087**
(2.458)

Yes
Yes
1,679
0.229

Yes
Yes
1,513
0.029

CFO_COMP_COV
RET_COV

Year Fixed Effect
Industry Fixed Effect
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
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Table 8: Common auditors and earnings misreporting
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results of earnings management and probit regression
results of earnings restatement (marginal effect reported). The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is
aggregate quarterly unexpected current accruals of the acquirer over the three quarters prior to the deal
announcement. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is aggregate quarterly unexpected current
accruals of the target over the three quarters prior to the deal announcement. The dependent variable in
Columns 5 and 6 is an indicator variable that equals one if the beginning date of the misstatement period
falls within a two-year window before the merger completion and zero otherwise. The other variables are
defined in Appendix. All the regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects and Fama and
French 48 industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. t/Z-statistics based on
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and firm clustering are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level,
respectively, based on two-tailed tests.

Variable
Common auditor
Auditor characteristics
Acquirer Big 4 auditor
Target Big 4 auditor
Acquirer auditor industry dominance
Target auditor industry dominance
Acquirer and target firm characteristics
Acquirer size
Acquirer Operating cash flows
Acquirer Tobin’s Q
Acquirer leverage
Acquirer pre-announcement stock pricerun-up
Target Operating cash flows
Target Tobin’s Q
Target leverage
Target pre-announcement stock pricerun-up
Deal characteristics
Relative deal size

(1)
(2)
Acquiror UA
-0.024** -0.024**
(-2.214)
(-2.181)

(3)
(4)
Target UA
-0.017
-0.015
(-0.906)
(-0.746)

(5)
(6)
Restatement
-0.034**
-0.031*
(-2.004)
(-1.920)

0.019
(0.560)
0.030
(1.334)
-0.023
(-1.392)
-0.006
(-0.410)

-0.023
(-0.574)
-0.012
(-0.502)
0.031
(1.073)
-0.011
(-0.384)

-0.029
(-0.667)
0.033
(1.269)
-0.009
(-0.373)
-0.030
(-1.500)

-0.005
(-1.331)
-0.130*
(-1.803)
0.001
(0.158)
0.011
(0.361)
0.007
(0.335)
0.022
(0.541)
0.005
(1.307)
0.019
(0.765)
-0.009
(-0.671)

-0.007
(-0.990)
-0.059
(-0.567)
-0.007
(-0.818)
-0.007
(-0.147)
0.030
(0.827)
-0.096
(-1.114)
0.026**
(2.504)
0.073*
(1.918)
-0.021
(-0.833)

0.004
(0.654)
-0.034
(-0.434)
-0.000
(-0.094)
0.059
(1.054)
-0.002
(-0.084)
0.096*
(1.649)
-0.009
(-1.430)
-0.080*
(-1.687)
0.057***
(3.154)

-0.001
(-0.115)

-0.020**
(-2.168)

-0.001
(-0.123)
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Percentage of stock financing
Tender offer
Hostile bid
Multiple bidders
High-tech firms
Additional controls
Diversifying acquisition
Corr(stock return)
Previous business relation
Toehold
Local deal

Year fixed effect
Industry fixed effect
Observations
Adj. /Pseudo R-squared

0.000
(0.402)
-0.015
(-1.029)
-0.028
(-0.986)
0.024
(1.004)
0.018
(0.852)

-0.000
(-0.324)
-0.009
(-0.414)
-0.047
(-1.323)
0.017
(0.459)
-0.015
(-0.422)

0.001***
(2.997)
0.022
(0.912)
0.022
(0.295)
0.017
(0.485)
-0.003
(-0.125)

0.001
(0.121)
0.026
(0.782)
0.002
(0.034)
0.000
(0.863)
-0.019
(-1.397)

-0.009
(-0.427)
-0.017
(-0.337)
0.095
(0.915)
0.001
(0.973)
-0.030
(-1.121)

0.037*
(1.928)
-0.058
(-1.313)
0.216**
(2.098)
0.001
(1.465)
-0.014
(-0.688)

Yes
Yes
1,526
0.031

Yes
Yes
1,526
0.050
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Yes
Yes
1,508
0.021

Yes
Yes
1,508
0.045

Yes
Yes
1,356
0.059

Yes
Yes
1,356
0.117

